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Abstract
We investigate the relation between symbolic and cryptographic secrecy prop-
erties for cryptographic protocols. Symbolic secrecy of payload messages or ex-
changed keys is arguably the most important notion of secrecy shown with auto-
mated proof tools. It means that an adversary restricted to symbolic operations on
terms can never get the entire considered object into its knowledge set. Crypto-
graphic secrecy essentially means computational indistinguishability between the
real object and a random one, given the view of a much more general adversary.
In spite of recent advances in linking symbolic and computational models of cryp-
tography, no relation for secrecy under active attacks is known yet.
For exchanged keys, we show that a certain strict symbolic secrecy definition
over a specific Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library implies cryptographic key
secrecy for a real implementation of this cryptographic library. For payload mes-
sages, we present the first general cryptographic secrecy definition for a reactive
scenario. The main challenge is to separate secrecy violations by the protocol un-
der consideration from secrecy violations by the protocol users in a general way.
For this definition we show a general secrecy preservation theorem under reactive
simulatability, the cryptographic notion of secure implementation. This theorem
is of independent cryptographic interest. We then show that symbolic secrecy im-
plies cryptographic payload secrecy for the same cryptographic library as used in
key secrecy. Our results thus enable formal proof techniques to establish crypto-
graphically sound proofs of secrecy for payload messages and exchanged keys.
1 Introduction
Proofs of cryptographic protocols are known to be error-prone and, owing to the
distributed-system aspects of multiple interleaved protocol runs, awkward to make for
humans. Hence automation of such proofs has been studied almost since cryptographic
protocols first emerged. From the start, the actual cryptographic operations in such
proofs were idealized into so-called Dolev-Yao models, following [2] with extensions
∗An earlier version of this paper appeared in [1].
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in [3,4], e.g., see [5–11]. These models replace cryptography by term algebras, e.g., en-
crypting a message m twice does not yield a different message from the basic message
space but the term E(E(m)). A typical cancellation rule is D(E(m)) = m for all m. It
is assumed that even an adversary can only operate on terms by the given operators and
by exploiting the given cancellation rules. This assumption, in other words the use of
initial models of the given equational specifications, makes it highly nontrivial to know
whether results obtained over a Dolev-Yao model are also valid over real cryptography.
One therefore calls properties and actions in Dolev-Yao models symbolic in contrast to
cryptographic.
Arguably the most important and most common properties proved symbolically
are secrecy properties, as initiated in [2]. Symbolically, the secrecy of a payload or a
cryptographic object like a secret key is typically represented by knowledge sets: The
object is secret if the adversary can never get the corresponding symbolic term into
its knowledge set. Cryptographically, secrecy is typically defined by computational
indistinguishability between the real object and a randomly chosen one, given the view
of the adversary. Hence symbolic secrecy captures the absence of structural attacks
that make the secret as a whole known to the adversary, and because of its simplicity
it is accessible to formal proof tools, while cryptographic secrecy constitutes a more
fine-grained notion of secrecy that is much harder to establish.
There has been significant progress in relating symbolic verification and real cryp-
tographic properties. Nevertheless, secrecy properties in this sense have not yet been
considered.
1.1 Related Work
Early work on linking Dolev-Yao-style models and real cryptography [12–14] only
considers passive attacks, and can therefore not make general statements about proto-
cols. The same holds for [15].
Our own line of work contains a number of related results. Primarily, we proposed
a specific Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library with a provably secure real implemen-
tation [16,17], and its extensions from public-key to symmetric systems [18,19].1 The
notion of “as secure as” proved there, also called reactive simulatability, is a powerful
notion that allows for general composition, i.e., the ability to prove protocols with the
ideal library and subsequently to plug in the real library. It essentially states that the
views of honest users are indistinguishable when they use either the ideal or the real
library, and, after composition, when they use a protocol with either the ideal or the
real library. This corresponds to the intuitive idea that a replacement of an ideal by a
real system is good if everything that can happen to users in the real system could also
happen to them in the ideal system.
However, this view of the users does not contain the adversary knowledge set as
typically used in symbolic secrecy proofs, and indeed this is a purely symbolic no-
tion that does not exist in an indistinguishable way in the real system. Nor does the
1In more recent work, drawing upon insides gained from the proof of the cryptographic library, we
showed that widely considered symbolic abstractions of hash functions and of the XOR operation cannot be
proven computationally sound in general, hence indicating that their current symbolic representations might
be overly simplistic [20, 21].
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user view contain the actual key bitstrings, which are cryptographically secret in the
real system, because this is a purely cryptographic notion that does not exist in an in-
distinguishable way in the ideal system. Hence, although we will essentially prove
below that symbolic secrecy implies cryptographic secrecy for this Dolev-Yao-style
library and its implementation, this is clearly not a direct consequence of the known
as-secure-as relation.
A second class of related results in this line of work are property preservation
theorems. So far, they have been proven for integrity, fairness, liveness, and non-
interference [22–27]. All these theorems are general for the notion of reactive simu-
latability and build on the indistinguishability of user views. Thus when specialized to
the Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library, they cannot yield the desired type of results
as we just saw. In fact, only non-interference is a kind of secrecy property, and it is
formulated as the flow of information from one user port to another, irrespective of
adversary views.
A third class of related results are protocol proofs above the cryptographic library.
Based on the specific Dolev-Yao model whose soundness was proven in these papers,
several well-known security protocols were proved in a computationally sound manner
[28–33]. Moreover, tailored tool support for this library was subsequently added [34,
35].
There is furthermore work on equivalence-based notions of secrecy, first for re-
lating symbolic and cryptographic secrecy under passive attacks [12–14] and subse-
quently extended to active attacks in [36]. In contrast to traditional knowledge- set-
based notions of secrecy, the notion of equivalence-based secrecy takes loss of partial
information into account but the respective works do not considered general reactive
frameworks in the sense of arbitrary surrounding protocols and do not address a con-
nection to the remaining primitives of the Dolev-Yao model. Finally, a much more
narrow result (in terms of possible protocols and preserved properties) about an ideal
and real cryptographic library, but with a slightly simpler real implementation, is given
in [37]. The property preserved here is explicitly only integrity. An extension of this
work considering the secrecy of exchanged keys has been proposed concurrently to our
work in [38] yet with a currently incomplete proof. It considers a similarly restrictive
class of protocols; in particular, the considered language offers public-key encryption
as the only cryptographic operation. Moreover, once a key has been exchanged the
bitstring of the key becomes known, hence protocols using this key cannot be analyzed
in a symbolic manner but their proofs have to be conducted within the underlying cryp-
tographic framework.
Hence there is still no theorem that symbolic secrecy properties defined via adver-
sary knowledge sets for a Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library imply cryptographic
secrecy of the corresponding real terms. We will provide such a theorem in this paper.
1.2 Overview of Our Results
The nicest possible theorem in our line of work would be that for the real and ideal
Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library from [16,18,19], all terms that are symbolically
secret are also cryptographically secret. However, such a strong statement does not
hold (and we believe that this has nothing to do with the specifics of this cryptographic
3
library). First, in many situations, symbolic secrecy does not exclude that partial infor-
mation about a cryptographic object has become known. This is quite natural given that
knowledge-set-based symbolic secrecy traditionally only states that the adversary does
not have an entire term in its knowledge set.2 One example is that a public key contains
partial information about a secret key, i.e., given the public key, everyone can distin-
guish the real secret key from a random one, for example by validating that signatures
made with the secret key are valid with respect to the public key, and similarly for en-
cryptions (the distinction for encryption keys is even easier if the generation algorithm
derives the public key from the secret key alone). The second example is that sym-
metric authentications and encryptions provide partial information about a symmetric
secret key, at least if one also has partial information about the message encrypted or
authenticated. Nevertheless, symbolic secrecy never classifies a secret key as known
to the adversary just because the corresponding public key or corresponding symmet-
ric encryptions and authentications are known to the adversary. A third and different
example is that a payload, i.e., a bitstring-message input to a protocol by a user, may
become known or partially known to the adversary by direct interaction with users
(e.g., a chosen-message attack) or by a user reusing this message or a statistically re-
lated message in another protocol run. Direct interactions of protocol users and the
adversary are typically excluded in symbolic models, and so is the reuse of a secret
message in other protocol runs. In a general cryptographic reactive setting, however,
this is not excluded a priori. For all these reasons our theorems have to be more specific
in that we need more stringent symbolic preconditions than only requiring absence of
a term in a knowledge set.
The problems just described are quite different for payloads and for the secrecy of
objects generated within the cryptographic library. Hence we prove different theorems
for the secrecy of payloads and of cryptographic objects, which in this context means
the secret keys typically exchanged in key-exchange protocols.
For payload secrecy, there is not even a general cryptographic secrecy definition
yet; definitions are specific to the protocols considered and contain an algorithm called
a message chooser [40] that selects one particular payload independent of all others and
not influenced by the adversary. This overcomes the described problems, but does not
easily generalize to arbitrary protocols and to realistic situations with message reuse
within a protocol run or across protocol runs, or where the adversary has a priori in-
formation about the payload. We introduce an extension: We let honest users generate
payloads as they like, but replace the payloads with random bitstrings of the same
length consistently between the user and the cryptographic system under consideration
when they occur in certain secret payload positions, e.g., for a two-party secure chan-
nel with inputs (send,m) and outputs (receive,m), the selection functions for inputs
and outputs would both select m, i.e., the second list element. The resulting definitions
are independent of the cryptographic library and give rise to a general payload secrecy
preservation theorem under reactive simulatability. In addition, we show that symbolic
secrecy in the sense of absence of a term in the adversary’s knowledge set implies the
2Recent work has also investigated more fine-grained notions of knowledge-set-based symbolic secrecy,
e.g., Blanchet [39] considers the notion of strong secrecy that reflects that changes of the secret cannot be
detected by the adversary, and the ideal cryptographic library [16] and the corresponding notions of symbolic
secrecy that we present in this paper allow leakage of certain additional information of terms.
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payload secrecy in this sense for the ideal cryptographic library and consequently for
the real cryptographic library.
For the secrecy of secret keys, we essentially restrict ourselves to the typical situ-
ation directly after a key-exchange protocol for this key: We require on the symbolic
side that no encryptions or authenticators with the exchanged key have yet been made,
or at least not become known to the adversary. Then we can indeed show that the cryp-
tographic key is completely indistinguishable from a random key, given the view of
the adversary. This is the typical key secrecy definition of cryptography. Although our
additional symbolic precondition excludes some key-exchange protocols that would be
considered secure by knowledge set based symbolic methods, these protocols are in
fact imperfect from a cryptographic point of view: A key-exchange protocol in cryp-
tography should be sequentially composable with an arbitrary protocol using this key,
e.g., a secure channel. The arbitrary protocol will be proved secure under the assump-
tion that it uses a fresh random key. Hence the key exchange protocol must guarantee
that the resulting key can be used wherever a fresh random key can be used. The only
way to guarantee this is by indistinguishability from a fresh random key. Indeed, a key
that has already been used as an authenticator might potentially end up in a protocol
where precisely this authentication can be used for a cross-protocol attack, thus de-
stroying the security of the protocol. Compared with message secrecy, this key-secrecy
theorem is relatively easy to state—we simply need the condition on keys to be not
only symbolically unknown to the adversary, but also symbolically unused. However,
the proof is complex because we have to augment the entire proof of the given cryp-
tographic library with corresponding statements about symbolic key handles and real
keys, in addition to the current statements aimed at proving only indistinguishability of
the user views.
We recently conducted a proof of key secrecy for the strengthened Yahalom pro-
tocol as one of the most prominent key exchange protocols analyzed using symbolic
techniques [41]. The proof shows symbolic key secrecy of the protocol when based on
the ideal cryptographic library and uses the results of this paper to derive cryptographic
key secrecy of the protocol based on the realization of the library. This furthermore
serves as an exemplification that our results are applicable to protocols commonly an-
alyzed in Dolev-Yao models.
2 Overview of the Underlying Dolev-Yao-Style Crypto-
graphic Library
In this section, we give an overview of the Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library
from [16, 18, 19], for which we will prove relations between symbolic and crypto-
graphic payload and key secrecy.
2.1 Terms, Handles, and Operations
As described in the introduction, a Dolev-Yao-style model abstracts from cryptographic
objects by terms of a term algebra. A specific aspect of the Dolev-Yao-style model
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in [16] is that participants operate on terms by local names, not by handling the terms
directly. This is necessary to give the abstract Dolev-Yao-style model and its realiza-
tion the same interface, so that either one or the other can be plugged into a protocol.
An identical interface is also an important precondition for the security notion of reac-
tive simulatability. One can see protocol descriptions over this interface as low-level
symbolic representations as they exist in several other frameworks, and it should be
possible to compile higher-level descriptions into them following the ideas first devel-
oped in [42]. The local names are called handles, and chosen as successive natural
numbers for simplicity and symbolic tractability.
Like all Dolev-Yao-style models when actually used for protocol modeling, e.g.,
using a special-purpose calculus or embedded in CSP or pi-calculus, the model in [16]
has state. An important use of state is to model which participants already know which
terms. Here this is given by the handles, i.e., the adversary’s knowledge set is the set
of terms to which the adversary has a handle.
Another use of state is to remember different versions of terms of the same structure
for probabilistic operations such as nonce or key generation. In [16], as probably first
in [6], the probabilism is abstracted from by counting, i.e., by assigning successive
natural numbers to terms, here globally over all types. This index of a term allows us
(not the participants) to refer to terms unambiguously.
The users can operate on terms in the expected ways, e.g., give commands to en-
or decrypt a message, to generate a key, or to in- or output a payload message. Further,
they can input that a term should be sent to another user; in the symbolic representation
this only changes the knowledge sets, i.e., in this specific Dolev-Yao-style library it
means that the intended recipient and/or the adversary (depending on the security of
the chosen channel) obtains a handle to the term.
2.2 Notation
The symbol “:=” denotes deterministic and “←” probabilistic assignment, and “ R←”
denotes the uniform random choice from a set. Let an alphabet Σ be given. The
length of a message m is denoted as len(m), and ↓ is an error element available as an
addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. The list operation
is denoted as l := (x1, . . . , xj), and the arguments are unambiguously retrievable as
l[i], with l[i] = ↓ if i > j. A database D is a set of functions, called entries, each
over a finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att
is written x.att . For a predicate pred involving attributes, D[pred ] means the subset
of entries whose attributes fulfill pred . If D[pred ] contains only one element, the
same notation is used for this element. Finally, NEGL denotes the set of all negligible
functions, i.e., g : N→ R≥0 ∈ NEGL iff for all positive polynomialsQ, ∃k0∀k ≥ k0 :
g(k) ≤ 1/Q(k).
2.3 Details about the State Representation
The overall representation of a state of the Dolev-Yao-style model of [16] is a database
D of the existing terms with their type (top-level operator), argument list, handles,
index, and lengths as database attributes. The length is needed because encryption
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cannot completely hide the length of messages. The non-atomic arguments of a term
are given by the indices of the respective subterm.
In detail, the database attributes of D are defined as follows, where H denotes the
set of user indices.
• ind ∈ INDS , called index, consecutively numbers all entries in D. The set
INDS is isomorphic to N; it is used to distinguish index arguments from others.
The index serves as a primary key attribute of the database, i.e., one can write
D[i] for the selection D[ind = i].
• type ∈ typeset defines the type of the entry. In particular, the type data de-
notes payloads, skse and ska denote secret encryption and authentication keys,
pkse and pka corresponding public tags, and symenc and aut denote symmetric
encryptions and authenticators. Other types will be introduced when first used.
• arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Many values ai
are indices of other entries in D and thus in INDS . They are sometimes distin-
guished by a superscript “ind”.
• hndu ∈ HNDS∪{↓} for u ∈ H∪{a} are handles by which a user or adversary
u knows this entry. The value ↓ means that u does not know this entry. The set
HNDS is yet another set isomorphic to N. Handles always get a superscript
“hnd”.
• len ∈ N0 denotes the “length” of the entry.
An example is shown in Figure 1. The left side indicates the main action that has
happened so far, the sending of an authenticated list with one element, a payload m.
The database first contains the symmetric authentication key of type ska together with
a public key tag of type pka. (These tags are needed to deal with situations where
the adversary can distinguish whether several symmetric authenticators or encryptions
have been made with the same key. Their abstract length is defined to be 0 for technical
reasons which will not matter in the following.) In the example, both participants know
the secret key, i.e., have a handle to it, while honest participants never have handles to
the public key tags. Then the database contains the payload data, the list, and the
authenticated message. The example assumes that this message has arrived safely so
that Pn has a handle to it, but has not yet been parsed by the recipient. After parsing,
the list and m get handles 3 and 4 for Pn, respectively. Note that the handles are indeed
local names, i.e., different for the two participants.
2.4 The Real Cryptographic Library
In the real implementation of the cryptographic library in [16, 18, 19], the central
database of all terms with handles (local names) for each user is replaced by a dif-
ferent machine for each user u. This machine contains a database Du with only three
main attributes: the handle hndu for this user u, the real cryptographic bitstring word ,
and the type type. The users can use exactly the same commands as to the ideal library,
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m
P
1 Pn: ind type arg hnd1 len
1 pka () 0
2 ska (1) 128
3 data m 1000
4 list (3) 1032
5 aut (4,1) 1200
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n
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Figure 1: Example of the database representation of terms
e.g., en- or decrypt a message etc. These commands now trigger real cryptographic op-
erations. The operations essentially use standard cryptographically secure primitives,
but with certain additional tagging, randomization etc. Send commands now trigger
the actual sending of bitstrings between machines and/or to the adversary.
2.5 Overall Framework and Adversary Model
So far we described the ideal and real cryptographic library informally. We now give an
overview of the underlying system model and introduce some more notation for later
use. The underlying machine model is an asynchronous IO-automata model. Hence the
overall ideal Dolev-Yao-style library, with its database D, is represented as a machine.
It is called trusted host. Actually there is one possible trusted host THcryH for every
subset H of a set {1, . . . , n} of users, denoting the possible honest users. It has ports
inu? for inputs from and outu ! for outputs to each user u ∈ H and for u = a, denoting
the adversary. The use of ports for attaching different channels to a machine and their
naming follows the CSP convention, e.g., the cryptographic library obtains messages
at inu? that have been output by a user machine at inu !.
Using the notation of [16], the ideal cryptographic library is a system Syscry,idn,L that
consists of several structures ({THcryH }, S
cry
H ), one for each value of H. Each structure
consists of a set of machines, here only containing the machineTHcryH , and a set S
cry
H :=
{inu?, outu ! | u ∈ H} denoting those ports of THcryH that the honest users connect
to. The set S cryH is called service ports or informally the user interface. Formally,
the system is Syscry,idn,L := {({TH
cry
H }, S
cry
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}, where L denotes a
tuple of length functions needed to compute the “length” of the abstract terms in the
database. The parameters n and L will not matter any further and are hence omitted in
the following.
In the real implementation of the cryptographic library, the same interface is served
by a set Mˆ cryH := {Mcryu | u ∈ H} of real cryptographic machines. The corresponding
system is called Syscry,realE,S,A,SE := {(Mˆ
cry
H , S
cry
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}, where E , S, A,
and SE denote the cryptographic schemes used for asymmetric encryption, signatures,
symmetric authentication, and symmetric encryption, respectively.
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2.6 Configurations, Runs, and Views
When considering the security of a structure (Mˆ , S ), an arbitrary probabilistic machine
H is connected to the user interface to represent all users, and an arbitrary machine A
is connected to the remaining free ports (typically the network) and to H to represent
the adversary. In polynomial-time security proofs, H and A are polynomial-time. The
resulting tuple (Mˆ , S ,H,A) is called a configuration, and the set of all configurations
of a system Sys is called Conf(Sys). A configuration is runnable, i.e., for each value
k of a security parameter one gets a well-defined probability space of runs. The view
of a machine in a run is the restriction to all in- and outputs this machine sees and its
internal states. Formally, the possible runs runconf in a configuration conf and the
view view conf (M) of a machine M in conf are a family of random variables with one
element for each security parameter value k. The notation r ∈ runconf abbreviates
that r is a possible run of conf , i.e., it belongs to the carrier set of an a random variable
in runconf .
2.7 Reactive Simulatability
The security proof of [16] states that the real library is at least as secure as the ideal
library. This is captured using the notion of reactive simulatability, which is the crypto-
graphic notion of secure implementation. For reactive systems, it means that whatever
might happen to an honest user in a (typically real) system Sys1 can also happen in
a (typically more ideal) system Sys2 given as a specification: For every user H and
every real structure and real adversary this user may interact with, there exists a corre-
sponding ideal structure and ideal adversary such that the view of H is computationally
indistinguishable in the two configurations. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Indistin-
guishability is a well-known cryptographic notion from [43].
Definition 2.1 (Computational Indistinguishability) Two families (vark)k∈N and
(var′k)k∈N of random variables on common domains Domk are computationally in-
distinguishable (“≈”) iff for every algorithm D (the distinguisher) that is probabilistic
polynomial-time in its first input,
|P (D(1k, vark) = 1)− P (D(1
k, var′k) = 1)| ∈ NEGL,
(as a function of k). ✸
Intuitively, given the security parameter and an element chosen according to either vark
or var′k, the distinguisher D tries to guess which distribution the element came from.
Definition 2.2 (Reactive Simulatability) For two systems Sys1 and Sys2, one says
Sys1 ≥sec Sys2 (at least as secure as) iff for every polynomial-time configuration
conf 1 = (Mˆ1, S ,H,A1) ∈ Conf(Sys1), there exists a polynomial-time configuration
conf 2 = (Mˆ2, S ,H,A2) ∈ Conf(Sys2) (with the same H) such that view conf 1(H) ≈
view conf 2(H). The relation ≥sec is also called simulatability. Universal simulatability,
written≥univsec , means that A2 does not depend on H (only on Mˆ1, S , and A1), and black-
box simulatability that A2 consists of a simulator Sim that depends only on (Mˆ1, S ) and
uses A1 as a blackbox submachine. ✸
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Figure 2: Simulatability example: The two views of H must be indistinguishable
Clearly, black-box simulatability implies universal simulatability; the cryptographic
library has been proven with blackbox simulatability. An essential feature of this defi-
nition of simulatability is a composition theorem [44, 45], which roughly says that one
can design and prove a larger system based on the ideal system Sys2, and then securely
replace Sys2 by the real system Sys1.
3 Secrecy of Payload Messages
Since we work in a reactive environment and since we quantify over all users, we
cannot simply define the secrecy of payloads by demanding that the adversary does not
learn them at all since the users themselves might send him the payloads. Thus we
have to capture that the adversary does not learn any information about the payloads
from the system. E.g., even a secure channel would clearly not offer secrecy in the strict
sense that the adversary does not learn the transmitted payloads at all, since the honest
sender or recipient might send the same payloads to the adversary. We therefore have
to separate information that leaks by user behavior from information that leaks in the
system. We first present a general cryptographic definition that captures this separation.
We then prove that this type of payload secrecy is preserved by “as secure as”. Finally,
we define a symbolic payload secrecy notion for protocols over the ideal Dolev-Yao-
style cryptographic library that also comprises this separation, and we prove that this
symbolic payload secrecy implies cryptographic payload secrecy for the protocol using
the real cryptographic library.
3.1 General Cryptographic Message Secrecy
To capture the separation between information leakage by a protocol and information
leakage by the users in a reactive framework, we define a replacement machine R that
replaces message parts that are supposed to be secret by random ones at the system
interface. If the system leaks no information about these message parts, then this re-
placement will not be distinguishable, no matter what information the honest users leak
about the real messages. The replacement must be done consistently for different in-
and outputs that should represent the same message; hence we have selection functions
for these message parts both in inputs and in outputs. For instance, for a two-party
secure channel with inputs (send,m) and outputs (receive,m), the selection functions
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for inputs and outputs would both select m, i.e., the second list element. On input a
command containing a selected payload m, the replacement machine replaces m by
a random payload n of the same length, stores the tuple (m,n) in a set T called a
replacement table, and outputs the command with the replaced parameters. To ensure
indistinguishable behavior to the users, the replacement machine further uses table-
lookup in T to transform messages received from the network back into their original
form.
We start the formal definitions by defining suitable selection functions.
Definition 3.1 (Payload Selection Function) A payload selection function is a function
that assigns every string l a potentially empty set of non-overlapping substrings of l. ✸
We now formally introduce the replacement machine. The selection functions of secret
input and output parts are called f and g. In order to wrap a structure with service
ports S by a replacement machine, we give the replacement machine these ports so
that the overall user interface remains unchanged, see Figure 3, and we use a consis-
tently renamed version of the port set to link the replacement machine and the original
machines. The complement of a port set, i.e., the ports the connecting machines need,
is denoted by SC .
Definition 3.2 (Replacement Machine) Let a port set S and payload selection func-
tions f , g be given. Let L : N → N ∪ {∞} be arbitrary. The replacement machine
RS ,f,g,L for S , f , g, and L is defined as follows: It has the port set S and a renamed
version S ′ of SC . It has an initially empty set T called replacement table and the
following transition rules:
• On input a message l at a port in S , let {m1, . . . ,mn} := f(l). Replace every
payload mi for which there exists exactly one ni with (mi, ni) ∈ T by ni in l.
For the remaining payloads mi set ni R← {0, 1}len(mi) \ {n | ∃m : (m,n) ∈ T},
T := T ∪ {(mi, ni)}, and replace mi by ni in l. Output the resulting string l′
to the underlying system at the corresponding port.
• On input a message l at a port in S ′, let {n1, . . . , nj} := g(l). Replace every
payload ni for which there exists exactly one mi with (mi, ni) ∈ T by mi in l.
Output the resulting string l′ to the honest user at the corresponding port.
We further define that RS ,f,g,L accepts L(k) inputs at each port in S ∪ S ′ with k being
the security parameter and that it reads the first L(k) bits of each input. ✸
It is easily provable that RS ,f,g,L is polynomial-time if L is polynomially bounded
since only a polynomial number of inputs of polynomial length are processed, hence
only a polynomial number of entries is created in T and the selection of payloads ni
is therefore easy to achieve in polynomial time. Moreover, it is clear by definition that
for every n there exists at most one m such that (m,n) ∈ T , and vice versa.
Reactive payload secrecy for an arbitrary system is now captured by requiring that
no user can distinguish whether it is interacting with an arbitrary adversary, the sys-
tem and a replacement machine, or with the same adversary, the system and a machine
F that simply forwards messages between the user and the system without modifying
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Figure 3: Sketch of the definition of reactive payload secrecy. The view of H should be
indistinguishable in both configurations.
them. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The forwarding machine is solely included to
achieve identical runtimes in both configurations, i.e., a user should not be able to dis-
tinguish both configurations since the replacement machines reaches its runtime bound
while the can continue interacting with the system in the other configuration. We first
formally introduce the forwarding machine and then give the definition of payload se-
crecy formally.
Definition 3.3 (Forwarding Machine) Let a port set S and a functionL : N→ N∪{∞}
be given. The forwarding machine FS ,L for S and L is defined as follows: It has the
port set S and a renamed version S ′ of SC . On input a message l at a port in S or S ′, it
forwards l to the corresponding port in S ′ or S , respectively. FS ,L accepts L(k) inputs
at each port in S ∪ S ′ with k being the security parameter and reads the first L(k) bits
of each input. ✸
Definition 3.4 (Reactive Payload Secrecy) Let a system Sys , be given. Let f and
g be mappings from the set {S | ∃(Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys} to the set of payload selection
functions. We write fS and gS instead of f(S ) and g(S ) in the following. Let (Mˆ , S ) ∈
Sys be arbitrary and let (Mˆ ′, S ′) be the structure where the port names of ports in S
are consistently replaced on the machines Mˆ as for the port set S ′ in RS,fS ,gS ,L, see
Figure 3. Then we say that the payload messages selected by fS and gS are
• perfectly secret in (Mˆ , S ), written (Mˆ , S ) = [fS , gS ](Mˆ , S ), iff for all functions
L : N → N ∪ {∞} and for all configurations conf = (Mˆ ′ ∪ {RS ,fS ,gS ,L}, S ,
H,A) and conf ′ = (Mˆ ′ ∪ {FS ,L}, S ,H,A) (i.e., with the same user H and ad-
versary A), we have view conf (H) = view conf ′(H).
• computationally secret in (Mˆ , S ), written (Mˆ , S ) ≈ [fS , gS ](Mˆ , S ), iff the
above holds for all polynomially bounded functions L, polynomial-time users
H, polynomial-time adversaries A, and with equality of views replaced by indis-
tinguishability of views.
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We say that the payload messages selected by f and g are perfectly respectively com-
putationally secret in Sys , written Sys = [f, g]Sys respectively Sys ≈ [f, g]Sys,
iff (Mˆ , S ) = [fS , gS ](Mˆ , S ) respectively (Mˆ , S ) ≈ [fS , gS ](Mˆ , S ) holds for all
(Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys .
✸
Clearly, perfect secrecy of payloads implies computational secrecy. The most natural
system that one expects to satisfy this definition is a secure channel. Indeed it can
easily be shown that the secure channel presented within our underlying framework
in [44] satisfies this notion with respect to the following selection functions fS and gS
for a considered structure (Mˆ , S ): Upon receiving an incoming message (send,m, v)
from an honest user, the function fS selects the message m if v is honest (which is
uniquely determined by S is fixed since the secure channel is based on a static cor-
ruption model), and it selects nothing if v is dishonest. Similarly, upon receiving a
message (received,m, u) from the channel, the function gS selects m if u is honest,
and it selects nothing otherwise. A formal proof would be conducted best by proving
this for the ideal abstraction of secure channels presented in [44] and by then applying
the payload secrecy preservation theorem that we present in Section 3.2 to carry the
result over to the cryptographic realization of the secure channel.
3.2 Payload Secrecy Preservation under Simulatability
We now show that if a system Sys1 is as secure as a system Sys2 in the sense of
universal simulatability, then secrecy of payloads selected by f and g in Sys2 implies
the secrecy of the same payloads in Sys1. This is a basis for proving payload secrecy
for ideal systems and deriving it automatically for corresponding real systems. It will
be further refined specifically for symbolic techniques to prove secrecy of payloads.
Theorem 3.1 (General Preservation Theorem for Payload Secrecy) Let systems Sys1,
Sys2 and mappings f2 and g2 from {S | ∃(Mˆ2, S ) ∈ Sys2} to the set of payload
selection functions be given. We write fS and gS instead of f2(S ) and g2(S ). Let
Sys1 ≥
univ
sec Sys2. Let f1 and g1 denote the restriction of the domain of f2 and g2 to
the set {S | ∃(Mˆ1, S ) ∈ Sys1 ∧∃(Mˆ2, S ) ∈ Sys2}. Then Sys2 ≈ [f2, g2]Sys2 implies
Sys1 ≈ [f1, g1]Sys1. ✷
proof 1 Let (Mˆ1, S ) ∈ Sys1 denote a structure. Because of Sys1 ≥univsec Sys2, there
exists a structure (Mˆ2, S ) ∈ Sys2 with the same set of service ports, hence fS ∈ f1
and gS ∈ g1. Let L be a polynomially bounded function. Let further (Mˆ ′1, S ′) be the
structure where the port names of ports in S are consistently replaced on the machines
as for the port set S ′ in RS ,fS ,gS ,L.
Let conf 1 = (Mˆ ′1 ∪ {RS ,fS ,gS ,L}, S ,H,A1) for an arbitrary polynomial-time user
H and an arbitrary polynomial-time adversary A1, and let conf ′1 = (Mˆ ′1 ∪ {FS ,L}, S ,
H,A1) for the same H and A1. We have to show that view conf 1(H) ≈ view conf ′1(H).
The proof is conducted in three steps, which are illustrated in Figure 4.
1. First, we combine the user H and the replacement machine RS ,fS ,gS ,L yielding a
new machineH#. Combination of H with the forwarding machine FS ,L similarly
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yields a machine H∗. Since H is polynomial-time by assumption and since FS ,L
and RS ,fS ,gS ,L are polynomial-time because L is polynomially bounded, H#
and H∗ constitute valid polynomial-time users for interacting with the structure
(Mˆ ′1, S
′). Moreover, there exists a combination lemma in the underlying model
stating that the view of a machine before the combination is identical to the view
of the same machine considered as a submachine of the combined machine. This
yields
view conf 1(H) = view conf #1
(H)
and
view conf ′
1
(H) = view conf ∗
1
(H),
where conf #1 = (Mˆ ′1, S ′,H#,A1), conf
∗
1 = (Mˆ
′
1, S
′,H∗,A1), and the views of
H in conf #1 and conf
∗
1 are defined in the aforementioned sense as a well-defined
function on the view of H# and H∗, respectively.
Now Sys1 ≥univsec Sys2 implies that there exist configurations conf #2 =
(Mˆ ′2, S
′,H#,A2) and conf ∗2 = (Mˆ ′2, S ′,H∗,A′2) such that view conf#1 (H
#) ≈
view
conf
#
2
(H#) and view conf ∗1 (H
∗) ≈ view conf ∗2 (H
∗). Universal simulatabil-
ity further implies that both A2 and A′2 may only depend on the machines of
the structure and on the adversary in conf 1 and conf
′
1, respectively. Since the
machines Mˆ ′1 of the structure and the adversary A1 are identical in both config-
urations, we obtain A2 = A′2. Projecting the view of H# and H∗ to the view of
its submachine H in the considered four configurations then yields
view
conf
#
1
(H) ≈ view
conf
#
2
(H)
and
view conf ∗1 (H) ≈ view conf ∗2 (H),
where we have exploited that applying a function (here the projection) to fam-
ilies of indistinguishable random variables yields families of indistinguishable
random variables again. Finally, the combination lemma yields
view
conf
#
2
(H) = view conf 2(H)
and
view conf ∗
2
(H) = view conf ′
2
(H),
where conf 2 = (Mˆ ′2 ∪ {RS ,fS ,gS ,L}, S ,H,A2) and conf
′
2 = (Mˆ
′
2 ∪ {FS ,L}, S ,
H,A2).
2. Now by assumption, we have Sys2 ≈ [f2, g2]Sys2, hence in particular
(Mˆ2, S ) ≈ [fS , gS ](Mˆ2, S ) for the structure (Mˆ2, S ) ∈ Sys2 that satisfies that
replacing the port names of ports in S as for the port set S ′ in RS ,fS ,gS ,L yields
the machines Mˆ ′2. Then the definition of payload secrecy applied to the configu-
rations conf 2 and conf ′2 in particular implies
view conf 2(H) ≈ view conf ′2(H).
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Note that conf 2 and conf ′2 are valid choices with respect to the definition of
messages secrecy, since universal simulatability implied that the adversaries in
both configurations are identical.
3. Finally, we exploit the transitivity of ≈ applied to the view of H in all eight
configurations, which yields view conf 1(H) ≈ view conf ′1(H). This finishes the
proof.
The preservation theorem constitutes a powerful tool for rigorously showing the se-
crecy of specific payloads in arbitrary reactive systems based on simple, usually even
deterministic abstractions. Specifically for protocols over the ideal Dolev-Yao-style
cryptographic library we can go even further and link the cryptographic secrecy notion
to the original idea of using symbolic techniques to establish the secrecy of payloads.
3.3 Symbolic Payload Secrecy and its Cryptographic Implications
For Dolev-Yao models, the original notion of the symbolic secrecy of a payload mes-
sage is that the adversary does not get this payload into its knowledge set, i.e., in the
current setting, that it does not get a handle to this payload. This is captured by the
following definition, which considers a protocol that runs on top of the cryptographic
library, corresponding to the usual scenario for symbolic secrecy analysis. The proto-
col is represented by a system Sys; typically such a system allows many interleaved
executions of one or more protocols in the narrow sense. The situation is illustrated in
Figure 5 with an arbitrary protocol user H and an arbitrary adversary A.
Definition 3.5 (Symbolic Payload Secrecy in Protocols) Let a system Sys =
{(MˆH, SH ∪ S
cry
H
C
) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} be given, i.e., a system that can use the cryp-
tographic library Syscry,id, and where the free ports of MˆH, i.e., the ports that are
connected to other machines, are SH ∪ S cryH
C for all H. We assume further that the
states of the machines in Sys are given by individual variables and their state transi-
tions by programs over these variables, so that we can speak of a static information-
flow analysis. Moreover, let mappings f and g be given as in Definition 3.4 for Sys .
Let Syscomb,id := {(MˆH∪{THcryH }, SH) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} denote the composition of
Sys and Syscry,id. Assume that the following holds, whereD denotes the cryptographic
term database:
• Within MˆH, static information flow from any input m at SH selected by fSH
only takes place by propagation of m itself.
• If MˆH passes such a value m (i.e., one that arose from information flow as in the
previous item) to THcryH , then only as the argument of a command store.
• If MˆH passes such a value m to SH, then only as a message part selected by gSH ,
and vice versa, i.e., gSH only selects such values m for replacement.
• A term D[i] resulting from such a command store(m) never gets an adversary
handle, i.e., D[i].hnda = ↓.
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Then we say that the payloads selected by f and g are symbolically secret in Syscomb,id.
✸
The condition that MˆH has no free ports except those connected to its user or the
cryptographic library means that the protocol does not communicate with the adversary
except via the send commands of the cryptographic library, i.e., by the Dolev-Yao-style
model.
Note that the notion of symbolic payload secrecy does not maintain any relationship
to complexity theory and should hence be in the scope of existing formal proof tools.
We now show that symbolic payload secrecy is sufficient for perfect payload secrecy.
By exploiting Theorem 3.1, we subsequently derive a corollary that links symbolic
secrecy to the cryptographic secrecy of the same protocol with a real cryptographic
implementation.
Theorem 3.2 (Symbolic and Perfect Payload Secrecy in Protocols) Let systems Sys
and Syscomb,id and mappings f and g be given as in Definition 3.5. If the payloads
selected by f and g are symbolically secret in Syscomb,id, they are perfectly secret in
Syscomb,id. ✷
proof 2 (Theorem 3.2.) With the notation of Definition 3.4, let (Mˆ ′H ∪ {THcryH }, S ′H)
for every H denote the structure where the port names of ports in SH are consis-
tently replaced on the machines in MˆH as for the port set S ′H in RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L. Let
conf = (Mˆ ′H ∪ {TH
cry
H ,RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L}, SH,H,A) for a set H and an arbitrary user
H and adversary A, and let conf ′ = (Mˆ ′H ∪ {TH
cry
H ,FSH,L}, SH,H,A), i.e., we have
a configuration of the protocol over the ideal cryptographic library with and without
payload replacement. We have to show that the views of H are equal in the two config-
urations. The proof is by induction over the steps of the runs. We show the following
stronger invariants, where D denotes the state of the database of THcryH in conf and
D′ that in conf ′:
1. The joint view of H and A is identical in conf and conf ′.
2. If D[i].type 6= data or D[i].arg [1] 6= n for all n ∈ {n | ∃m : (m,n) ∈ T}, then
D[i] = D′[i].
3. If D[i].type = data and there exists (m,n) ∈ T such that D[i].arg [1] = n, then
D[i] = D′[i] except that D′[i].arg[1] = m.
4. If the values v and v′ of a variable of Mˆ ′H are different in conf and conf ′, then
v = n and v′ = m for a pair (m,n) ∈ T .
To prove this, we consider an arbitrary prefix of a run in each configuration where the
invariants are fulfilled, and an arbitrary next step in both configurations. By a step
we typically mean a machine transition, except that we consider individual program
execution steps within Mˆ ′H. For simplicity, we assume that an input to Mˆ ′H is first
stored in a variable and outputs of Mˆ ′H come directly from a variable.
• A message between H and A clearly retains the invariants.
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• So does an input from H to RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L or FSH,L, but it may lead to differ-
ent outputs n from RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L and m from FSH,L for the next step, where
(m,n) ∈ T .
• Such different inputs from RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L or FSH,L to Mˆ ′H may lead to different
variable values in Mˆ ′H, but this difference does not invalidate Invariant 4. Equal
inputs clearly retain the invariants.
• Steps within Mˆ ′H retain Invariant 4; in particular the program execution remains
synchronized between conf and conf ′ because no information flow except by
assignments is allowed from the unequal variables.
• Inputs from Mˆ ′H to the cryptographic library can only differ in arguments of the
command store by a precondition; then a payload n is stored in conf and m in
conf
′ with (m,n) ∈ T . Hence Invariant 3 is maintained.
• Outputs from the cryptographic library to the adversary A can only differ if a
corresponding input command operates on an entry of type data and makes an
output to A. This is only the case for a command retrieve input by A. However, a
differing entry has a value n in conf and m in conf ′ with (m,n) ∈ T by Invari-
ants 2 and 3. Such an entry in conf has no adversary handle by a precondition,
and by Invariant 3 also not in conf ′. Hence no such output can happen, and
Invariant 1 is retained.
• An output from the cryptographic library to Mˆ ′H can only differ if it is the result
of a command retrieve on differing data. By similar arguments as in the previous
cases, Invariant 4 is retained.
• If an output value from Mˆ ′H is o to RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L in conf and o′ to FSH,L in
conf ′, then FSH,L forwards o′. We want to show that so does RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L. By
a precondition o and o′ differ at most in fields selected by the function gSH , and
the field value is then n in o and m in o′ with (m,n) ∈ T . Hence RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L
replaces these fields by m, making them equal to the corresponding fields in o′.
Conversely, every field of o that is selected by gSH is such a value n that arose
by direct assignment of a value n from the replacement table T , and thus the
corresponding value in conf ′ is m, so that the replacement is correct.
• Outputs from RSH,fSH ,gSH ,L or FSH,L to H are always equal, as we just saw,
and thus retain Invariant 1.
Putting everything together, we have shown that view conf (H) = view conf ′(H). Hence
the payload messages selected by fSH and gSH are perfectly secret.
The complexity of the symbolic information-flow analysis underlying symbolic pay-
load secrecy depends on the protocol language. Some simple high-level protocol ex-
pressions do not allow any information flow on payload messages except by direct
assignments x := y, in particular the classical arrow notation without branching. Then
the first condition is fulfilled for all protocols expressed in this language, and typically
so is the second condition because of typing. Other languages may allow branches and
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thus indirect information flow, but still no direct operators on payload messages. Com-
bining such an information-flow analysis with an analysis of the knowledge sets of a
Dolev-Yao model (here represented by the possible adversary handles) that can arise
by executing the protocol, is a standard problem addressed by symbolic proof tools for
cryptographic protocols.
Combining the results of Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.1, and the fact that the real cryp-
tographic library is as secure as the ideal one [16,18,19] yields the following corollary,
which links symbolic secrecy to the cryptographic secrecy of the same protocol with a
real cryptographic implementation. This shows that symbolic payload secrecy is suf-
ficient for cryptographic payload secrecy provided that the system Sys is polynomial-
time. The polynomial runtime of the system can either be shown by hand or within a
specific calculus that allows for reasoning about probabilistic polynomial time, e.g., the
one of [46]. In contrast to Theorem 3.2 we furthermore do not need separate mappings
f1 and f2 respectively g1 and g2 since there is a one-to-one correspondence between
structures of the ideal and the real cryptographic library.
Corollary 3.1 With the notation of Definition 3.5, let the payload messages selected by
f and g be symbolically secret in Syscomb,id and let Sys be polynomial-time. Then the
payloads selected by f and g are computationally secret in the system Syscomb,real :=
{(MˆH ∪ Mˆ
cry
H , SH) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} where Mˆ
cry
H denotes the set of machines of the
real cryptographic library for a set H. ✷
4 Key Secrecy
In this section, we investigate the relationship of the secrecy of symmetric keys in the
symbolic and the cryptographic approach. We define symbolic key secrecy for the
ideal Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library and cryptographic key secrecy for the real
library, and we show that symbolic key secrecy implies cryptographic secrecy of the
corresponding keys.
The symbolic secrecy definition is based on the typical notion that a term is not
an element of the adversary’s knowledge set. Recall that in the given Dolev-Yao-style
library, the adversary’s knowledge set is the set of all database entries (representing
terms) to which the adversary has a handle. However, as explained in the introduction,
we cannot hope to show the strong notion of cryptographic key secrecy, i.e., that the
real cryptographic adversary cannot distinguish a real key from a fresh random key, for
all keys without an adversary handle, but only for keys that are also unused, i.e., no
corresponding encryption or authenticator has an adversary handle.
Furthermore, we have to be careful with the notion of correspondence between
ideal and real keys for the secrecy preservation theorem. Originally, runs of either the
ideal system or the real system are defined separately, and a per-key correspondence
exists only in the simulatability proof. We start by using this correspondence. Then
we define a more abstract correspondence notion without reference to the proof by
characterizing the keys to be secret as a function of the user view, which exists in each
system and should be indistinguishable between them.
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4.1 Symbolic and Cryptographic Key Secrecy
As a first step towards defining symbolic key secrecy, we consider one state of the
ideal Dolev-Yao-style library and define that a handle points to a symmetric key, that
the key is symbolically unknown to the adversary, and that it has not been used for
encryption or authentication. These are the symbolic conditions under which we can
hope to prove that the corresponding real key is indistinguishable from a fresh random
key for the adversary. Note that such a key may have been treated in the ways usual in
key exchange protocols, e.g., an honest user may have put it into a list, encrypted the
list, and sent it to another honest user.
For the third condition in the following definition, note that the arguments of a
symmetric authenticator and a symmetric encryption with a key of an honest user are
of the form (l, pk) where l is the plaintext index and pk the index of the public tag of
the secret key, with pk = sk − 1 for the secret key index.
Definition 4.1 (Symbolically Secret Keys) Let H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, a database state D
of THcryH , and a pair (u, lhnd) ∈ H × HNDS of a user and a handle be given. Let
i := D[hndu = l
hnd].ind be the corresponding database index. We say that the term
under (u, lhnd)
• is a symmetric key iff D[i].type ∈ {ska, skse}.
• is symbolically unknown to the adversary, or short symbolically unknown, iff
D[i].hnda = ↓.
• has not been used for encryption/authentication, or short is unused, iff for all
indices j ∈ N we have
D[j].type ∈ {aut, symenc} ⇒ D[j].arg [2] 6= i− 1.
• is a symbolically secret key iff it has the three previous properties.
✸
Essentially we want to show that symbolically secret keys are also cryptographically
secret. However, the only direct correspondence between one particular symbolic key
and one particular real key exists in a so-called combined system within the proof of
the cryptographic library. Hence we will establish both a close per-key relation for
the combined system (Lemma 4.1) and a more abstract theorem that considers each
of the real and ideal systems as a whole (Theorem 4.1). For the latter, we introduce a
function seckeys based on the user view that indicates the keys that the users consider
secret. We show that if this consideration is always correct in the ideal system in the
symbolic sense, then it is also always correct in the real system in the cryptographic
sense. In practical situations, such a function seckeys might denote “the second key
that was exchanged between users u and v”, or “all keys that were the results of a
successful key-exchange protocolKX”. In particular, the latter type of function seckeys
is the symbolical formulation of secrecy goals on key exchange protocols. Formally,
the function seckeys maps the user view to a set of triples (u, lhnd, t) of a user, a handle,
and a type, pointing to the supposedly secret keys.
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Definition 4.2 (Secret-key Belief Function) A secret-key belief function for a set H
(intuitively the indices of honest participants) is a function seckeys with domain Σ∗
and range (H×HNDS × {ska, skse})∗. ✸
We first define symbolic key secrecy for such a function. In addition to the conditions
for individual keys, we require that all elements point to different terms, so that we can
expect the corresponding list of cryptographic keys to be entirely random.
Definition 4.3 (Symbolic Key Secrecy for the Ideal Cryptographic Library) Let a user
H, a structure ({THcryH }, S
cry
H ) of the cryptographic library Sys
cry,id and a secret-key
belief function seckeys for H be given. We say that the cryptographic library with
this user keeps the keys in seckeys strictly symbolically secret iff for all configurations
conf = ({THcryH }, S
cry
H ,H,A) of this structure, every v ∈ view conf (H), and every
element (ui, lhndi , ti) of the list seckeys(v), the term under (ui, lhndi ) is a symbolically
secret key of type ti, and D[hndui = lhndi ].ind 6= D[hnduj = lhndj ].ind for all i 6= j.
✸
This definition lends itself to automated proof tools because it is entirely symbolic
and belongs to the typical class of secrecy properties proven with such tools. The
typical formulation is that no ideal adversary can obtain certain designated terms into
its symbolic knowledge set. In the given model, the knowledge sets are defined by the
possession of handles to terms.
We define cryptographic key secrecy similar to cryptographic definitions for key-
exchange protocols: We demand that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish the
keys designated by the function seckeys from fresh keys. This is illustrated in Figure 6.
Definition 4.4 (Cryptographic Key Secrecy for the Real Cryptographic Library) Let
a polynomial-time configuration conf = (Mˆ cryH , S
cry
H ,H,A) of the real cryptographic
library Syscry,realE,S,A,SE and a secret-key belief function seckeys for H be given. Let genA
and genSE denote the key generation algorithms of A and SE , respectively. We say
that this configuration keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret iff for all
probabilistic-polynomial time algorithms Dis (the distinguisher), we have
|Pr[Dis(1k, va, keysreal) = 1]
− Pr[Dis(1k, va, keysfresh ) = 1] ∈ NEGL
(as a function of the security parameter k), where the used random variables are defined
as follows: For r ∈ runconf , let va := view conf (A)(r) be the view of the adversary,
let (ui, lhndi , ti)i=1,...,n := seckeys(view conf (H)(r)) be the user-handle-type triples
of presumably secret keys, and let the keys be keysreal := (ski)i=1,...,n with ski :=
Dui [hndui = l
hnd
i ].word if Dui [hndui = lhndi ].type = ti and ski := ǫ otherwise, and
keysfresh := (sk
′
i )i=1,...,n with
sk ′i ← genA(1
k) if ti = ska,
sk ′i ← genSE(1
k) if ti = skse,
and sk ′i ← ǫ otherwise. ✸
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4.2 Preservation of Key Secrecy
We can now state our main key-secrecy theorem: If for certain honest users H and
a secret-key belief function seckeys, the ideal cryptographic library keeps the keys in
seckeys symbolically secret, then every configuration of H with the real cryptographic
library keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret.
Theorem 4.1 (Symbolic Key Secrecy Implies Cryptographic Key Secrecy) Let a
polynomial-time honest user H of a structure ({THcryH }, S
cry
H ) of the ideal cryptographic
library Syscry,id and a secret-key belief function seckeys for H be given such that the
cryptographic library with this user keeps the keys in seckeys strictly symbolically
secret. Then every polynomial-time configuration (Mˆ cryH , S
cry
H ,H,A) of the real cryp-
tographic library Syscry,realE,S,A,SE (with the same user H) keeps the keys in seckeys cryp-
tographically secret. ✷
This theorem makes statements about adversary handles and real keys, which only exist
in either the ideal or the real cryptographic library, respectively. Hence the theorem
cannot be proved solely as a consequence of the as-secure-as relation, in other words
reactive simulatability, between these two systems, because reactive simulatability only
concerns the indistinguishability of the views of the honest users H. We therefore
extend the simulatability proof from [16,18,19] to the desired property. The basic proof
structure is that a combined system C∗H is defined that essentially contains all elements
of both the real and the ideal system. In particular, it contains a database structured like
D but with an additional attribute word for real bitstrings corresponding to the terms,
as they are generated by the simulator. A second combined system CH contains the
real bitstrings as generated by the real machines. An important invariant of C∗H is word
secrecy, which states that no information flows from certain variables into others that
are or may later become known to the adversary. We use the following word-secrecy
lemma as a basis for our key secrecy proof.
Lemma 4.1 (Word Secrecy with Symmetric Keys) Let H and A be machines such
that (Mˆ cryH , S
cry
H ,H,A) is a polynomial-time configuration of the real cryptographic
library Syscry,realE,S,A,SE . Then the following invariant holds in runs of the configura-
tion ({C∗H}, S
cry
H ,H,A) except with negligible probability: Given a state DC∗H of the
database of the combined system, let the set Pub Var of “public” variables contain
• all words DC∗
H
[i].word with DC∗
H
[i].hnda 6= ↓, i.e., the real messages where the
adversary has learned the corresponding term symbolically,
• the state of A and H, and the THcryH -part of the state of C∗H,
• the secret keys of public-key schemes where the public keys are known to the
adversary, i.e., the words DC∗
H
[i].word with DC∗
H
[i − 1].type ∈ {pke, pks} and
DC∗
H
[i− 1].hnda 6= ↓, and3
3These secret keys are included because information from them flows into the public keys, but they do
not get adversary handles when the public keys are published.
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• the symmetric secret keys for which an encryption or authenticator is public,
i.e., the words DC∗
H
[i].word where an index j exists with DC∗
H
[j].hnda 6= ↓ and
DC∗
H
[j].type ∈ {aut, symenc} and DC∗
H
[j].arg [2] = i− 1.
Then no information from other variables has flown into Pub Var in the sense of
information flow in programming languages, i.e., static program analysis. ✷
The full versions of [16, 18, 19] prove a slightly weaker version of the word secrecy
lemma as part of the overall proof of soundness. The version is weaker in that the
surrounding proof of soundness only required that no information might flow from a
certain subset of other variables into the set Pub Var instead of requiring the absence
of information flow from all such variables. However an inspection of this proof shows
that the stronger variant as presented in Lemma 4.1 holds without changes in the exist-
ing proof.
Lemma 4.1 gives the tight correspondence of symbolic secrecy and cryptographic
secrecy for individual keys that was mentioned in the introductory sections. However,
such per-key considerations only work for information-theoretic security; this is why
the lemma is formulated for the combined system C∗H which contains some simulated
aspects instead of the combined system CH with the completely real bitstrings; for CH
we only show more abstract key secrecy similar to Definition 4.4, i.e., a nonce-secrecy
theorem.
Before actually proving Theorem 4.1, we give an overview of the underlying simu-
latability proof from [16,18,19] that we extend. Figure 7 gives an overview of the orig-
inal proof. The top row shows the real configuration and the ideal configuration with
the simulator. The basic proof structure is that a combined system CH (lower right in
Figure 7) is defined that essentially contains all elements of both the real and the ideal
system. In particular, it contains a database structured like D but with an additional
attribute word for the real bitstrings corresponding to the terms. Then bisimulations
are proved between CH and the real machines, and between CH and the trusted host
with the simulator (Steps 5a and 5b of Figure 7). A bisimulation, however, cannot deal
with computational indistinguishability. Hence at the beginning of the proof, the real
asymmetric encryptions are replaced by simulated ones as made in the simulator (there,
all ciphertexts where the plaintext is symbolically secret contain a fixed plaintext string
instead), using a low-level idealization of asymmetric encryption and the composition
theorem (Steps 1 and 2 of Figure 7). Symmetric encryption cannot be treated with such
a simple one-step replacement. The successive exchange of real encryptions for simu-
lated encryptions is therefore done by a so-called hybrid argument (Step 4 in Figure 7)
that considers multiple indexed combined systems C(i)H , each replacing the encryptions
with one key. The bisimulation mappings from the initial and final combined systems
to the real and ideal system, respectively, are called derivations because they essentially
extract the relevant elements from the combined systems unchanged.
An important invariant of the combined system C∗H is word secrecy, which states
that no information flows from certain variables into others that are or may later become
known to the adversary. It was stated in Lemma 4.1. We are now ready to present the
proof of the key secrecy theorem.
proof 3 (Theorem 4.1.) We fix a polynomial-time user H and a polynomial-time ad-
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versary A suitable for the real cryptographic library and thus for all the configurations
shown in Figures 7 and 8. We assume that the ideal cryptographic library keeps the
keys in seckeys strictly symbolically secret.
Symbolic secrecy in C∗H. The derivation of the ideal system from the combined one, i.e.,
the bisimulation φ in Figure 8, maps all state elements of the ideal system identically.
By the bisimulation property this derivation is invariant and the view of H equal in runs
of the ideal or combined system except on a negligible error set. As strict symbolic key
secrecy is defined in terms of state elements of the ideal system and the view of H, it is
also fulfilled in the combined system C∗H except with negligible probability ǫ (a function
of k), i.e., the terms designated by seckeys are different secret keys of the correct types,
do not have adversary handles, and are unused.
Cryptographic secrecy in C∗H via word secrecy. It follows immediately that, still in C∗H,
the word attributes of terms designated by seckeys are not in the set Pub Var , except
with probability ǫ. These words are exactly the random variable keysreal , if we define
this random variable for each combined system by ski := D[hndui = lhndi ].word if
D[hndui = l
hnd
i ].type = ti, else ǫ. By word secrecy for C∗H, no static information flow
therefore takes place from keysreal into variables in Pub Var , and thus in particular
into the view va of A, except with probability ǫ.
We now fix a distinguisher Dis as in the definition of cryptographic key secrecy, i.e.,
it gets inputs (1k, va, keysreal) or (1k, va, keysfresh), where the keys in keysfresh are
by definition generated by the same algorithms as those in keysreal , but independently
of the system run. Total absence of information flow would imply that va contains no
Shannon information about keysreal , and thus the two distributions would be perfectly
indistinguishability. In reality, the distinguisher Dis may only have an advantage over
this situation in the runs in the error set, and thus its advantage is negligible.
Cryptographic secrecy in CH via hybrid argument. Next we show that the advantage
of Dis is still negligible for the combined system CH, which contains real instead of
simulated symmetric encryptions. Assume for contradiction that it were not. We then
construct a machine Dis′, called extended system distinguisher, that can distinguish
the views vh of H and va of A and additionally keysreal . From its inputs Dis′ computes
l := seckeys(vh). Given the key types in l, it can generate a suitable list keysfresh . It
then runs Dis on the adversary view va and either keysreal or keysfresh . The result for
the two types of keys is, by the assumption, significantly different for CH but not for
C∗H. This allows Dis
′ to distinguish CH and C∗H with not negligible advantage.
Our result does not yet contradict the indistinguishability of CH and C∗H from the
original proof because our extended distinguisher also gets keysreal as input. We there-
fore have to extend the hybrid argument to extended distinguishers. The framework of
the hybrid argument can remain identical; we only need to show that Dis′ cannot dis-
tinguish any two neighboring hybrid systems. Two such hybrids differ only in making
either real or simulated encryptions with one particular symmetric key sk (i), which is
defined as the i-th key used for encryption. The proof uses a machine SymComb that
contains one symmetric encryption key sk∗ and a bit b and, depending on b, makes ei-
ther real or simulated encryptions with sk∗, and in the latter case answers decryption
requests by table look-up. A lemma in [19] states that the two cases of b are indistin-
guishable. We want to show for contradiction that if Dis′ can distinguish two hybrids,
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one can also distinguish the two cases of b in SymComb. This would be trivial if the
key sk (i) in the hybrids were only used for en- and decryption; one could simply re-
alize the two hybrids by a fixed part C′(i)H in combination with SymComb with either
b = 0 or b = 1. The proof still essentially works like this, but the key sk (i) might
also be put into lists, sent around, etc. This cannot be done with the internal key sk∗
from SymComb. Hence C′(i)H keeps its own key sk (i) for these purposes. In [19] it is
shown that this use of two different keys instead of one is perfectly indistinguishable for
normal (non-extended) distinguishers. (This only holds because of the precise order in
which the different keys are treated in the successive hybrids.) The proof of perfect
indistinguishability shows that no information about the “outer” sk (i) used by C′(i)H
flows into the view of H and A. These proof parts are still true, but we have to add
a third part showing that no information about sk (i) flows into the additional input
keysreal for the extended distinguisher Dis′.
As keysreal consists of keys generated by the honest users, and thus with the cor-
rect key generation algorithms, no information about sk (i) flows into the list keysreal
unless sk (i) is one of the keys in keysreal . However, by the definition of the hybrids,
sk (i) is a used key, and by the correctness of seckeys, the list keysreal only consists of
unused keys. Hence this can indeed be excluded. This finishes the proof that the hybrid
argument is still correct for the more powerful distinguishers Dis′, and thus the proof
that cryptographic key secrecy holds for the most real combined system CH.
Cryptographic secrecy in the real system. Finally, the derivation of the real system
from the combined one, i.e., the bisimulation φ′ in Figure 7, maps all the user handles
and all the word attributes corresponding to them identically, and thus in particular the
list keysreal . By the bisimulation property this derivation is invariant and the view of A
equal in runs of the combined or real system except on a negligible error set. Hence the
advantage of Dis can only differ by a negligible function, as its inputs only depend on
these invariant values. Thus the advantage of Dis is also negligible on the real system.
As a by-product of this proof, we furthermore obtain that also nonces without adversary
handle, i.e., nonces that are symbolically secret, are indistinguishable from randomly
chosen bitstrings of the same length in the real cryptographic library.
5 Conclusion
For the first time, we have linked symbolic secrecy with real cryptographic secrecy
notions under arbitrary active attacks and for arbitrary surrounding protocols. Sym-
bolic secrecy of certain terms is essentially defined by the absence of these terms from
an adversary’s knowledge set, cryptographic secrecy by the indistinguishability of the
real secret bitstrings from fresh random bitstrings of the same type, given the view
of a real, cryptographic adversary. We based our results on the Dolev-Yao-style ideal
cryptographic library from [16, 18, 19] and its provably secure implementation. We
pointed out why symbolic secrecy does not imply cryptographic secrecy for all terms
and in all situations and therefore investigated two particularly important cases sepa-
rately, payload (application data) secrecy and key secrecy. For the former, we came
up with a general cryptographic secrecy definition that separates information leakage
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about a payload by the users themselves from information leakage in the system, and
we showed that symbolic key secrecy of the protocol implies that no information leaks
in the protocol. For key secrecy, we defined realistic, symbolically verifiable condi-
tions beyond the absence of a key from the adversary’s knowledge set and showed
that these conditions imply full cryptographic secrecy of the corresponding real key.
In order to exemplify the applicability of our results to protocols commonly analyzed
in Dolev-Yao models, we recently conducted a proof of symbolic key secrecy for the
strengthened Yahalom protocol based on the ideal cryptographic library, and we used
the results of this paper to derive cryptographic key secrecy of the protocol based on
the realization of the cryptographic library.
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